DNS Edge: Addressing GAO’s “High Risk” Cybersecurity Findings
As cybersecurity risks increase, experts are beginning to think of strong solutions that can tackle many aspects of security at once. DNS is one of them.
The article discusses the Government Accountability Office's expanded designation of cybersecurity as a high-risk area across government operations, highlighting widespread vulnerabilities in IT systems that lead to incidents disrupting operations and risking sensitive information. Drawing from 2017 FISMA data, GAO found over 35,000 incidents with phishing, web application attacks, and improper use comprising large portions, and many incidents categorized as “other,” indicating unresolved vulnerabilities. The piece argues DNS is a critical, underused security control—capable of blocking IoT threats, improving incident detection when deployed internally, aiding network segmentation, and fostering joint network-security response—to help address GAO recommendations and reduce future risk.
According to the article, why is DNS considered an important but underappreciated tool for addressing GAO cybersecurity concerns?
The article explains DNS is both an ideal attack vector and a central network service commonly used by attackers for navigation, unauthorized access, and command-and-control—citing that over 91% of cyberattacks use DNS for command and control. Its ubiquity leads to complacency, as security teams may not coordinate with network teams that manage DNS. Because DNS sits at the network core, it can be repurposed as a security asset to block malicious queries, enforce segmentation, and provide data for detection and response, aligning with multiple GAO recommendations around protecting emerging technologies and enhancing incident response.
What specific GAO recommendations does the article claim DNS solutions can help fulfill, and how?
The article maps DNS capabilities to several GAO recommendations: to ensure security of emerging technologies it recommends client-facing DNS tools (for example, blocking IoT queries without agents); to improve government-wide cybersecurity initiatives it suggests deploying DNS-based EINSTEIN filters inside agency networks rather than only at the perimeter to gather more actionable telemetry; to address federal information security weaknesses it advocates using DNS configurations for network segmentation to reduce unauthorized access; and to enhance federal incident response it promotes a joint prevention-and-mitigation approach that leverages DNS to bring network and security teams together.
What evidence from the GAO and FISMA data does the article cite to underscore the severity of government cybersecurity issues?
The article cites GAO’s designation of cybersecurity as a high-risk area and references GAO analysis of FISMA data showing more than 35,000 security incidents reported by agencies in 2017. It highlights that roughly one-third of reported vulnerabilities were phishing and web application incidents, another quarter resulted from improper use, and about one-third were classified as “other,” indicating a substantial portion of incidents remain insufficiently analyzed. The piece uses this data to argue that perimeter defenses alone are insufficient and that deeper controls—such as DNS-based measures—are needed to address persistent and diverse threats.
The Government Accountability Office first identified cybersecurity as a “high risk area” over twenty years ago. As detailed in a report released this week, that high risk area now covers an even broader swath of government operations, including cyber threats to critical infrastructure and privacy protection.
GAO’s cyber assessment is both stark and damning for the entire government enterprise: “IT systems are often riddled with security vulnerabilities—both known and unknown.” The stakes are high – security incidents and cyberattacks on government systems “disrupt critical operations; lead to inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information; and threaten national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety.”
Drawing from FISMA data, GAO categorized over 35,000 security incidents reported by government agencies in 2017. Phishing and web application incidents constitute around one-third of all reported vulnerabilities. This suggests that boundary-level firewalls and filters cannot be trusted to protect government networks on their own – malicious code is still getting through. Another quarter of reported incidents were caused by “improper use”, suggesting that internal network controls are still lacking. Perhaps most troublesome is the one-third of incidents marked as “other”, suggesting that government IT systems are vulnerable in ways which have yet to be fully analyzed.
A simple fix? Not for cybersecurity
There are no silver bullets in cybersecurity, and it would be naïve to state that any one factor could address all of the 1,000 open GAO recommendations.
Yet DNS is an intriguing (if underappreciated) aspect of many vulnerabilities identified in the GAO report. What do malicious phishing and web application attackers use to navigate their way through the network? DNS. Which protocol serves as the gateway for unauthorized users to access forbidden parts of the network? DNS. What do over 91% of cyberattacks utilize for command and control? DNS.
Just as the ubiquitous nature of DNS makes it an ideal attack vector, its position at the network core also contributes to complacency in addressing the inherent vulnerabilities of DNS infrastructure. Cybersecurity teams may not realize that their most precious and effective asset is down the hall with their network colleagues. In their GAO-recommended plans, agency IT administrators would do well to think of their existing DNS infrastructure as an untapped security asset.
What DNS can do to keep us safe
Here are just a few examples of how DNS can address the GAO’s most pressing recommendations:
- Ensure the security of emerging technologies (p. 20): Using client-facing DNS security tools like BlueCat’s DNS Edge, IT administrators can block all queries from IoT devices without the need for cumbersome agents.
- Improve implementation of government-wide cybersecurity initiatives (p. 22): If DHS deployed its DNS-based EINSTEIN filters inside agency networks instead of on the network boundary, it would gather more actionable information and enable timely agency responses to cyber incidents.
- Address weaknesses in federal information security programs (p.23): Using DNS configurations to segment networks would go a long way toward eliminating unauthorized access on Federal systems.
- Enhance the federal response to cyber incidents (p.25): At BlueCat, we know that a joint approach is needed for both prevention and mitigation of cybersecurity incidents. DNS already has a track record of bringing network and security teams together to enhance cyber response.
The cybersecurity responsibilities of Federal agencies will only become more complex and harder to implement over time. DNS is the kind of low hanging fruit which it makes sense to address now – before the next GAO report shows the problem spreading even further.
Want to learn more about the role of DNS in government cybersecurity? See BlueCat’s security resources here.