What is DNS poisoning (DNS spoofing) and how to prevent it
DNS poisoning (aka DNS cache poisoning or DNS spoofing) uses security gaps in the DNS protocol to redirect internet traffic to malicious websites.
Read moreA rogue DNS server is an unauthorized resolver that returns false answers to DNS queries, redirecting clients to attacker-controlled IP addresses through malware, compromised routers, or spoofed DHCP responses. Because DNS sits in front of nearly every network connection and standard DNS lacks response authentication, a single resolver compromise can affect all applications on a device or every device on a network without users noticing. Organizations can detect and prevent rogue DNS servers through DHCP snooping, resolver allow lists, egress filtering of port 53, DNS traffic monitoring, and DNSSEC validation, enabling rapid response to unauthorized resolver queries.
A rogue DNS server only affects a client that sends queries to it, so the attack centers on getting a device to use the wrong resolver. Once that happens, the server controls the answers the client receives.
The client usually has no indication that the answer is false, because standard DNS does not authenticate responses. DNSSEC validation can expose forged answers for signed zones, but only if the client or its trusted resolver performs validation.
A device on the LAN, such as a consumer router plugged into an office port, answers DHCP requests and hands out its own DNS address. Affected clients show a different resolver in their lease while others on the same VLAN look normal, which makes the problem look intermittent.
A compromised router with a default or weak admin password has its upstream DNS entries replaced. Every device behind it resolves through the attacker, and the change often survives reboots of the clients.
The rogue server answers most names correctly and forges only a few, such as banking or update domains. Routine checks pass, so the issue shows up only as certificate warnings or failed updates on specific sites.
Clients using a rogue resolver cannot resolve internal names or get wrong answers for them. Support tickets report that intranet or directory services fail while public sites still load.
Outbound DNS to arbitrary external servers is allowed, so malware that sets its own resolver goes unseen. Flow data or firewall logs show port 53 traffic to unfamiliar addresses, but nothing alerts on it.